Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An Argument for the Convergence of the Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition and Trademark Law by Beckerman-Rodau, Andrew
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 23 Volume XXIII 
Number 1 Volume XXIII Book 1 Article 3 
2013 
Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An Argument for the 
Convergence of the Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition and 
Trademark Law 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau 
Suffolk University Law School, arodau@suffolk.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An Argument for the Convergence of the 
Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition and Trademark Law, 23 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 132 
(2013). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol23/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An Argument for the Convergence of the 
Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition and Trademark Law 
Cover Page Footnote 
Professor of Law & Co-Director, Intellectual Property Law Concentration, Suffolk University Law School, 
Boston, Massachusetts. J.D., 1981, Western New England University School of Law; L.L.M., 1986, Temple 
University School of Law; B.S. (Engineering), 1976, Hofstra University. Email: arodau@suffolk.edu; 
website: http://lawprofessor.org. Special thanks to Matthew Traister (Suffolk University Law School Class 
of 2012) for research assistance. 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol23/iss1/3 
C03_BECKERMAN-RODAU (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2012 2:13 PM 
 
132 
Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An 
Argument for the Convergence of the 
Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition 
and Trademark Law 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau* 
 The right of publicity—the most recently developed type of 
intellectual property—allows a person to control commercial use 
of his or her identity.  The scope of the right has expanded 
significantly since its inception because many courts and 
commentators have misinterpreted it, viewing it as a pure property 
right justified by a labor or unjust enrichment theory.  Rather, this 
article contends that it should be evaluated in light of the 
utilitarian justification for intellectual property law.  Rewarding 
people by allowing them to monetize their public persona is not the 
goal of the right of publicity.  The goal should be to incentivize 
individuals to engage in creative endeavors for the benefit of the 
public.  Accordingly, a right of publicity action should only be 
available if commercial use of an individual’s persona will result 
in the likelihood that consumers will be misled into thinking the 
individual endorsed or approved of the use of his or her identity.  
However, such confusion-based conduct is already actionable 
under trademark and unfair competition law.  Therefore, I argue 
that any use of a person’s persona that creates an association with 
the person but does not create a likelihood that consumers will 
think the person endorsed or approved of the commercial use 
should only be actionable if the person is famous.  This is 
consistent with trademark dilution law, which limits association-
based trademark actions to famous trademarks.  This approach 
places the right of publicity within the domain of intellectual 
property law and preserves the existing balances between 
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protecting property rights, preventing free riding, and preserving   
robust free speech rights.            
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INTRODUCTION 
The right of publicity is a relatively new body of law designed 
to protect the legal right of a person to control commercial use of 
his or her identity.1  It is viewed by courts and commentators as 
 
* Professor of Law & Co-Director, Intellectual Property Law Concentration, Suffolk 
University Law School, Boston, Massachusetts. J.D., 1981, Western New England 
University School of Law; L.L.M., 1986, Temple University School of Law; B.S. 
(Engineering), 1976, Hofstra University.  Email: arodau@suffolk.edu; website: 
http://lawprofessor.org.  Special thanks to Matthew Traister (Suffolk University Law 
School Class of 2012) for research assistance. 
 1 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The right 
of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin which has been defined as the 
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her 
identity.”); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 
1983) (“The theory of the right is that a celebrity’s identity can be valuable in the 
promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the 
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part of the body of intellectual property law, which includes patent, 
copyright, trademark, and trade secrets law.2 
Over the last few decades, intellectual property law has seen a 
significant expansion of protected subject matter.3  More recently, 
however, legislative and judicial efforts have signaled—at least in 
 
unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.”); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE 
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 at 3 (2012 ed.).   
 2 See ROGER SCHECHTER & JOHN THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF 
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 1.1 at 1 (2003); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 
1:3 at 3.  Patent law protects particular embodiments of certain new inventions. See 35 
U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  Copyright law, codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332, protects the 
form of expression of aesthetic creations such as literary and artistic works. See 
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra.  Trademark law, which protects the mental association 
created in the mind of consumers when a word, phrase, device, or other commercial 
symbol is used to trigger an association with a product or service, is a composite of state 
common law, state statutory law, and federal statutory law. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 
(2012) (Federal Trademark statute called the Lanham Act); PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. 
ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 167 
(6th ed. 2008). See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1329.54–1329.67 (state trademark statute); 
see also Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 
(1942) (trademarks are used “to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential 
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears”).  Trade secrets law 
protects commercial information or know-how, which provides a competitive 
marketplace advantage as a consequence of being maintained as a secret.  Trade secrets 
law has common law origins. Schechter & Thomas, supra, § 24.1 at 529.  Today most 
states have adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1985), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=130067 (last visited October 15, 2012).  
For information on the states that have adopted the Act see 
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited June 1, 
2012).  Additionally, a federal trade secrets law called the Economic Espionage Act 
allows the government to bring civil and criminal actions for trade secret 
misappropriation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in the 
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to 
afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”); see also Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ 
en/text.jsp?file_id=130067 (last visited October 15, 2012), which states:  
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) 
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
 3 See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property 
Rights: Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 36, 39 (2010). 
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the area of patent law—a desire to restrict or limit the domain of 
protectable intellectual property.4  Similarly, early right of 
publicity cases greatly expanded the scope of the right,5 while 
some recent cases have reversed this trend.6 
This Article will briefly review the history and development of 
the right of publicity.  It will examine the underlying justifications 
for this right because its scope can best be determined in light of its 
reasons for existence.  Furthermore, this Article will argue that 
many courts and commentators have misinterpreted the right of 
publicity by viewing it as a pure property right justified by a labor 
or unjust enrichment theory.  Instead, I argue that the right of 
publicity should be evaluated in light of the utilitarian justification 
for intellectual property law generally.  This Article will argue that 
the right is a species of intellectual property law rather than a pure 
freestanding property right.  As such, rewarding people by 
allowing them to monetize their public persona is not the right of 
publicity’s aim.  Rather, the aim should be to incentivize 
individuals to engage in creative endeavors for public benefit, 
echoing the broader utilitarian goals of intellectual property law.7  
Also, because of the communicative aspects involved, the right 
must be balanced against First Amendment free speech 
requirements—just as trademark and copyright rights are 
balanced.8  Accordingly, this Article will argue that the right of 
publicity provides excessive and unwarranted legal protection 
especially in light of the expansive protection provided by 
trademark and unfair competition law today.  This supports an 
argument for greatly restricting the right of publicity. 
 
 4 See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1297 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010). 
 5 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–98 (9th Cir. 
1992); Carson, 698 F.2d at 835. 
 6 See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[S]ome courts have indicated that the 
right of publicity is intended to promote only economic interests and that noneconomic 
interests are more directly served by so-called rights of privacy. . . . We see merit in this 
approach.”). 
 7 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 3, at 47–48. 
 8 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
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Violations of the right of publicity based merely on a showing 
that an unauthorized third party used a person’s identity in a 
commercial context should not be actionable.  Such association-
based uses should be within the public domain.  In contrast, if the 
use of someone’s persona will result in a likelihood that consumers 
will be confused with regard to whether the person endorsed or 
approved of the use of his or her identity in the commercial 
activity, then it should be actionable.  Reliance on a likelihood of 
confusion standard is consistent with existing trademark and unfair 
competition law,9 and it reflects the careful balance developed 
between protecting intellectual property rights and conflicts with 
the First Amendment when communicative conduct is involved.10 
The expanded nature of modern trademark and unfair 
competition law can provide adequate relief for confusion-based 
actions for the use of someone’s persona.  The additional 
protection for mere association-based use of a person’s identity is 
generally not justified in light of the utilitarian objectives of 
intellectual property law and First Amendment concerns.  
Analogous to existing trademark dilution law, I propose that a 
person should only be able to assert a right of publicity action 
based on an association-use of his or her persona if the person is 
famous.  The article concludes with a proposed framework which 
places the right of publicity within the domain of intellectual 
property law.  This encourages in the right of publicity context the 
striking of the same balance utilized in intellectually property law 
generally—a balance between protecting property rights, 
preventing free riding, and preserving a robust public domain for 
speech. 
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S DEVELOPMENT 
The right of publicity is rooted in privacy law.11  Aspects of a 
legal right to protect individual privacy can be traced back to 
ancient Talmudic and Roman law.12  Nevertheless, as late as 1890 
 
 9 See Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 10 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976. 
 11 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:7 at 9. 
 12 See id. § 1:9 at 13. 
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a right of privacy was unrecognized under English or United States 
common law.13  In 1890, Warren and Brandeis published their 
famous article, which argued in favor of adopting a common law 
right of privacy.14  Initially, some courts rejected adopting such a 
right15 while other courts favored the idea.16  Nevertheless, privacy 
law continued to be an amorphous area of law until an influential 
law review article authored by William Prosser in 1960 
categorized privacy law into four distinct torts: intrusion, public 
disclosure of private facts, false light in the public eye, and 
appropriation.17 
Intrusion was defined as an invasion of a person’s privacy that 
a reasonable person would find objectionable or offensive.18  For 
example, surreptitiously peering into a private residence to take a 
picture of a person would be an intrusion,19 but taking a picture of 
that person in a public area would be permissible.20 
Public disclosure of private facts, in contrast to intrusion, was 
designed to protect an individual’s reputation.21  Prosser saw it as 
an extension of defamation law.22  But unlike defamation law—
where the truthfulness of publicly disseminated information was a 
complete defense—the truth or falsity of the facts was not the 
controlling issue of the right of privacy.23  Public disclosure of 
 
 13 W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 849 (5th ed. 1984). 
 14 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
196 (1890). 
 15 See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 556 (N.Y. Ct. of 
App. 1902) (“An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion that the so-
called ‘right of privacy’ has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, 
as we view it, the doctrine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled 
principles of law by which the profession and the public have long been guided.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73 (Ga. 1905) (“[A] 
violation of the right of privacy is a direct invasion of a legal right of the individual.”). 
 17 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 18 Id. at 390–91; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:20 at 33–34. 
 19 See Prosser, supra note 17, at 392. 
 20 Id. at 391. 
 21 See id. at 398. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See id.; MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:22 at 37 (observing that falsity of disclosed 
information is an element of a defamation action but not an element of a right of privacy 
action based on public disclosure of private facts). 
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truthful facts that were private in nature could be actionable if a 
reasonable person would find such disclosure objectionable.24  For 
example, public disclosure of a person’s tax returns, which are 
confidential records, could be actionable.25  In contrast, public 
disclosure of a person’s birth date or admission to the bar would 
not be actionable since that is public information.26 
False light in the public eye, unlike public disclosure of private 
facts, involves publication of information that may injure a 
person’s reputation by implying something that is untrue.27  Like 
the other privacy actions discussed above, the offense must consist 
of something an ordinarily reasonable person would find 
objectionable under the circumstances.28  For example, using the 
picture of a person to illustrate an article on illegal criminal 
activity when the person pictured has no involvement in the 
activity is actionable because it can falsely imply to the public that 
the person is involved in such activity.29  Prosser viewed a false 
light action as overlapping and including defamation.30  However, 
his view was that such an action could also cover conduct beyond 
the narrow scope of defamation.31 
Appropriation was defined as the unauthorized use of a 
person’s name or likeness.32  For example, if the picture of a 
celebrity is used without permission to advertise a product or 
service, that celebrity may have an action for appropriation.33  
 
 24 See Prosser, supra note 17, at 396; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:21 at 36–
37 (observing that public disclosure of private facts provides an action for public 
disclosure of private information that is embarrassing to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities). 
 25 Prosser, supra note 117, at 395–96. 
 26 Id. at 396. 
 27 Id. at 400. 
 28 Id.  
 29 Id. at 399. 
 30 Id. at 400; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:22 at 37 (nebulous areas of law 
that extends defamation law). 
 31 Prosser, supra note 17, at 400–01. But see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:22 at 38 
(noting it is not clear the U.S. Supreme Court sees a distinction between defamation and 
false light actions). 
 32 Prosser, supra note 17, at 401–02; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:23 at 39 
(most appropriation cases involve commercial use of a person’s name or picture). 
 33 Prosser, supra note 17, at 401–02. 
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Prosser noted that at least one court had called a right of privacy 
action by appropriation a right of publicity action.34  He also 
suggested that this action was really an economic right that 
allowed a person to control the use of his name or likeness in the 
commercial context.35  In contrast, intrusion, public disclosure of 
private facts, and false light involve actions to protect privacy and 
reputation.36 
The appropriation action identified by Prosser appears to have 
been the basis for the right of publicity,37 initially enunciated by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
1953.38  Subsequently, a 1954 law review article by Melville 
Nimmer provided a theoretical framework for differentiating the 
right of privacy from the right of publicity.39  Other commentators 
also asserted the notion that right of privacy actions based on 
intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light were 
distinguishable from a right of privacy action based on 
appropriation.40  Subsequent case law, including one United States 
Supreme Court decision, recognized the right of publicity as a 
valid state law cause of action.41 
Today, the right of privacy and the right of publicity have 
become separate causes of action despite having a common 
ancestor.42  The right of privacy protects the right to be left alone 
 
 34 Id. at 406–07. 
 35 Id. at 406. 
 36 Id.  
 37 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:23 at 39. 
 38 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 
1953). 
 39 See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 203, 204–10 (1954) (discussing the inadequacies of privacy law in protecting the 
values of publicity). 
 40 See, e.g., 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 9.7, at 
689–91 (1956) (asserting that appropriation actions involve financial considerations 
unlike typical privacy actions which involve emotional distress, humiliation, and 
interference with personal dignity).  
 41 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 567 (1977). 
 42 In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 
1983), the court stated that right of privacy actions based on intrusion, public disclosure 
of private facts, and false light generally protect the right to be left alone while the 
appropriation action—which it called the right of publicity—protects a celebrity’s 
monetary interest in exploiting his or her identity.  “Thus, the right of privacy and the 
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and the right to be free from third parties obtaining and publicizing 
personal information.43  Remedies for privacy violations are 
tortious in nature and focus on compensation for resulting mental 
and emotional injuries as well as injury to reputation.44  In contrast, 
an appropriation action has been generally renamed a right of 
publicity action,45 which protects intangible property.46  Remedies 
for violation of the right of publicity are typically property-based 
remedies that focus on recovering the economic value of a persona 
when, for example, it is used without consent in a commercial 
context—such as enhancing or promoting the sale of a product by 
associating it with a well-known person.47  Although right of 
publicity actions are often deemed tort actions, the tortious conduct 
is interference with a person’s property per se.48 
By the 1980s, the recognition of a property-based right of 
publicity action was well accepted.49  As a result, the majority of 
 
right of publicity protect fundamentally different interests and must be analyzed 
separately.” Id. See also State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 
S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (courts view right of publicity as distinct from right 
of privacy). 
 43 See Carson, 698 F.2d at 834. 
 44 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 11:26–27 at 736–37 (describing damages based on 
resulting mental distress flowing from privacy violation). 
 45 Carson, 698 F.2d at 834. 
 46 See e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL 
H. SCHILL, PROPERTY 66 (7th ed. 2010) (explaining that the right of publicity is a 
property interest that includes typical attributes of property such as right to both inter 
vivos and testamentary transfers); see also Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459 
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding right of publicity a type of property); Herman Miller, Inc. v. 
Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 325 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding right of 
publicity is a property right that can extend beyond death); Hart v. Elec. Arts Inc., 808 F. 
Supp. 2d 757, 773 (D.N.J. 2011) (noting right of publicity is property right); Crowell, 733 
S.W.2d at 97 (holding right of publicity is intangible personal property); Marshall 
Leaffer, The Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1357, 1361, 
1367 (2007) (treating right of publicity treated as pure property right). 
 47 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 
(10th Cir. 1996) (“Publicity rights . . . are meant to protect against the loss of financial 
gain, not mental anguish.”). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 11:30–31 at 
751–52 (discussing that damages for violation of the right of publicity are based on 
commercial injury, not mental or emotional injury). 
 48 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3 at 3 (explaining that infringement of right of 
publicity is a tort action based on interfering with a property right). 
 49 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:31 at 64 (“By the mid 1980s, the initial phase of 
questioning what the right of publicity was and why it should exist passed largely into 
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states recognize the right of publicity today via case law, statute or 
both, although the scope and duration of the right varies from state 
to state.50  The development of the law then shifted to defining the 
scope of the right of publicity.51 
II. THE CHANGING SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Some early decisions broadly construed the right of publicity52 
while some more recent decisions have significantly narrowed the 
scope.53  Arguably, this reflects the typical development of a new 
area of law.  A new right slowly expands until it creates 
unintended consequences such as invading the scope of a 
competing right.54  Then, one right preempts the conflicting right 
or judicial theories must be developed to balance the competing 
rights so they can coexist.55 
 
history.”); id. § 10:7 at 506–10 (stating that courts uniformly hold that right of publicity 
is a property interest). 
 50 See id. §§ 6:1–8 at 854–72 (providing detailed state-by-state overview of the right of 
publicity); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(5) (West 2012) (stating Florida right of 
publicity statute provides for rights to last forty years after death); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-
36-1-8 (West 2012) (stating Indiana right of publicity statute provides for rights to last 
one hundred years after death); DONALD S. CHISUM, TYLER T. OCHOA, SHUBHA GNOSH & 
MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 6G [6], at 766 (2d ed. 
2011) (asserting New York and Wisconsin do not recognize any postmortem right of 
publicity). See generally MEDIA LAW RESOURCE CENTER, INC., MEDIA PRIVACY AND 
RELATED LAW 2008–09 (2008) (providing detailed state-by-state overview of both the 
right of privacy and the right of publicity). 
 51 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:31 at 64. 
 52 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(reasoning that the common law right of publicity is not confined to the appropriation of 
name or likeness); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 
1983) (“[A] celebrity’s legal right of publicity is invaded whenever his identity is 
intentionally appropriated for commercial purposes.”).  
 53 See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding “CBC’s first amendment rights 
in offering its fantasy baseball products supersede the players’ rights of publicity”). 
 54  See e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–69 (1995) (taking 
an expansive view of what could be registered as a trademark under federal law, the court 
created the potential for trademark rights to unfairly interfere with competition). 
 55 See id. (expanding the functionality doctrine to enable a court to deny trademark 
rights to something serving a trademark function if it created a non-reputational 
marketplace advantage which could interfere with competition); see, e.g., Traffix Devices 
v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2001) (restating the Court’s holding in Qualitex 
by distinguishing between cases of aesthetic functionality rather than functional design).   
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A. Broad Interpretation of the Scope of the Right of Publicity 
In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,56 the well-
known entertainer Johnny Carson sued a Michigan portable toilet 
company whose corporate name was Here’s Johnny Portable 
Toilets, Inc.57  The company’s founder adopted the name knowing 
it was the slogan used to introduce Mr. Carson on his television 
program The Tonight Show.58  He combined the phrase with a 
second phrase—“The World’s Foremost Commodian”—to create 
“a good play on a phrase.”59  Mr. Carson, however, objected to the 
business of renting or selling portable toilets under the name 
“Here’s Johnny.”60  He sued the company, asserting, among other 
things, unfair competition, trademark infringement, and violation 
of his right of publicity.61  The trial court dismissed all the 
claims.62  It held that although the founder intended to free ride on 
the popularity of the phrase, he did not intend to deceive the 
public.63  Additionally, the court found that the evidence failed to 
demonstrate any likelihood of consumer confusion from the use of 
the phrase to sell portable toilets.64  In light of the absence of a 
likelihood of confusion, the court found the unfair competition 
claim invalid.65  Likewise, the court dismissed the right of 
publicity claim holding that it only applied to the use of a person’s 
name or likeness and that neither was being used to sell portable 
toilets.66  On appeal the trial court’s dismissal of the unfair 
competition claim was upheld in light of Mr. Carson’s failure to 
 
 56 698 F.2d 831. 
 57 Id. at 833. 
 58 See id. at 833, 836 (asserting that President and owner of the company admitted that 
the phrase “Here’s Johnny” would not have been adopted to sell portable toilets if public 
didn’t associate phrase with Mr. Carson). 
 59 Id. at 833. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 834. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 833.  Although the Carson court did not specifically discuss the trademark 
infringement claim, the absence of any likelihood of confusion would negate a trademark 
infringement claim as well as an unfair competition claim. See GMC v. Keystone Auto. 
Indus., 453 F.3d 351, 354 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that test for trademark infringement 
and for unfair competition is likelihood of consumer confusion). 
 66 Carson, 698 F.2d at 833. 
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show likelihood of confusion.67  However, the dismissal of the 
right of publicity claim was vacated and remanded68 based on the 
appellate court’s holding that Mr. Carson’s right of publicity was 
violated.69 
The appellate court determined that the right of publicity was 
not limited to the use of a person’s name or likeness,70 concluding 
that anything intentionally used in a commercial context that 
creates an association with a celebrity can amount to commercial 
exploitation of the celebrity’s identity.71  In Carson, the appellate 
court determined that use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny” in selling 
portable toilets could support Mr. Carson’s claim because it creates 
an association with him in the minds of consumers even though a 
consumer would not think he endorsed or was affiliated with the 
portable toilet business.72  The decision therefore distinguishes 
between commercial use that merely creates an association-based 
relationship with a celebrity and commercial use that creates a 
confusion-based relationship with a celebrity, which may cause 
consumers to incorrectly believe the celebrity endorsed or is 
affiliated with the product.73  This distinction is clearly illustrated 
by Carson when the appellate court held that a right of publicity 
claim was viable74 despite an express finding that consumers were 
unlikely to believe Mr. Carson endorsed or had any connection 
with the portable toilet business.75 
 
 67 Id. at 834. 
 68 Id. at 837. 
 69 Id. at 836. 
 70 Id. at 835. 
 71 See generally id. at 835 (“If the celebrity’s identity is commercially exploited, there 
has been an invasion of his right [of publicity] whether or not his ‘name or likeness’ is 
used.”). 
 72 Id. at 836. 
 73 See generally Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that false advertising action requires a likelihood of consumer confusion, but a right of 
publicity claim does not require any likelihood of consumer confusion).  
 74 Carson, 698 F.2d at 836. 
 75 See id. at 834. See generally Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212 
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that unfair competition action requires likelihood of consumer 
confusion, but right of publicity action does not require any likelihood of confusion). 
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Nine years later, the Ninth Circuit issued an equally broad 
decision in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.76  This 
case involved an advertisement for Samsung video cassette 
recorders.77  The advertisement showed a robot dressed up in a 
wig, gown, and jewelry on a television set that was similar to that 
of the game show Wheel of Fortune.78  Although the robot did not 
use the  face or likeness of the show’s host, Vanna White,79 the 
overall appearance of the robot, including how it was posed and its 
location on what appears to be the show’s set, was intentionally 
designed to make viewers think of Ms. White.80  Ms. White sued 
Samsung, asserting violation of the California right of publicity 
statute,81 the California common law right of publicity,82 and the 
federal unfair competition statute.83 
The trial court granted summary judgment against Ms. White 
on all causes of action.84  The appellate court affirmed the trial 
court with regard to the California statutory right of publicity 
action85 because the statute only applies if specific characteristics, 
such as name or likeness, are used.86  Also, the district and 
appellate courts agreed that neither Ms. White’s name nor her 
likeness were used in the Samsung advertisement.87  The appellate 
court reversed the trial court with regard to the common law right 
of publicity action88 after concluding that, unlike the statutory 
cause of action, the common law action was not limited to 
appropriation of specific celebrity characteristics such as a name or 
likeness.89  With regard to the unfair competition cause of action, 
 
 76 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993). 
 77 Id. at 1396. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 1397. 
 80 Id. at 1396. 
 81 Id. at 1395. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2012). 
 82 White, 971 F.2d at 1396. 
 83 Id. at 1395. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 84 White, 971 F.2d at 1396–97. 
 85 Id. at 1397. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 1399. 
 89 Id. at 1397. 
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the court reversed and remanded to the trial court.90  This action 
turns on whether the advertisement created a likelihood of 
consumer confusion,91 which was an issue of fact to be determined 
by a jury.92  This broad view of the common law right of publicity 
is consistent with the result in the Carson case.  Additionally, the 
independent treatment of the common law right of publicity action 
and the unfair competition action means the White court made the 
same distinction the Carson court made between an association-
based commercial use of a celebrity’s persona and a confusion-
based commercial use. 
B. Narrowing Interpretation of the Scope of the Right of Publicity 
Several grounds for narrowing or limiting the right of publicity 
have been asserted in court.  These include preemption based on 
federal copyright law93 and interference with First Amendment 
considerations.94  Preemption arguments have generally been 
unsuccessful95 but some courts have found that First Amendment 
considerations provide fertile ground for restraining the right of 
publicity.96 
 
 90 Id. at 1401. 
 91 Id. at 1399–1400.  
 92 Id. at 1401. 
 93 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
 94 See generally ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(“There is an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of 
expression under the First Amendment.”). 
 95 See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:50 at 832 (stating how the majority rule is that 
federal copyright law does not preempt state-based right of publicity); Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 
225–26 (2002) (nothing that few courts have found right of publicity preempted by 
copyright law); see, e.g., Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D. 
Minn. 2010) (rejecting argument that federal copyright law preempted state right of 
publicity action). But see Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1134, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (holding federal copyright law does preempt right of publicity action). 
 96 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 
(10th Cir. 1996) (finding that First Amendment considerations outweighed right of 
publicity rights). See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769 (D.N.J. 
2011) (describing how courts use a balancing test to determine if First Amendment free 
speech rights limit a right of publicity action).  
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In the video game market, information about actual athletes has 
been incorporated into games without the athlete’s consent.97  
Electronic Arts, Inc. produces a series of video games based on 
college football, which allows users to simulate collegiate football 
games.98  One of the players depicted in the game asserted that 
virtual players in the game utilized characteristics of actual players 
in order to achieve realism.99  The player sued for violation of his 
right to publicity.100  In response to a motion to dismiss,101 the trial 
court held that the First Amendment did not bar a right of publicity 
action.102 
In another video game case, C.B.C. Distribution and 
Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P.,103 an Internet-based fantasy baseball league operated a for-
profit business that used the names, biographical data, and 
performance statistics of actual Major League Baseball players 
without permission.104  The court concluded that the baseball 
players depicted in the game met the prima facie elements 
necessary to sustain a right of publicity action.105  However, the 
court then held that those rights were superseded by the First 
Amendment.106  Despite reliance on the First Amendment, the 
court’s reasoning largely focused on an analysis of the underlying 
purposes or justifications for the existence of the right of 
publicity.107  The court noted that the justifications include 
 
 97 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10719, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 98 Id. at *6. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Id. at *7–8. 
 101 Id. at *5. 
 102 Id. at *12. See also Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D. 
Minn. 2010) (holding, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the right of publicity 
action by football players included in NFL promotional videos was not outweighed by 
First Amendment).  However, in Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 794 
(D.N.J. 2011), after the court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the interaction of the 
right of publicity and the First Amendment, the court found that the First Amendment 
trumped the right of publicity with regard to the same video game at issue in Keller. 
 103 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 104 See id. at 820. 
 105 Id. at 822–23. 
 106 Id. at 823. 
 107 Id. at 824. 
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allowing an individual to gain the economic benefit of his or her 
endeavors, incentivizing a person’s productive activities, 
protecting natural rights, and rewarding celebrity labor.108  The 
court then determined that none of these justifications would be 
interfered with by denying a right of publicity action in this case 
because Major League Baseball players are already well paid and 
can earn substantial additional income via sponsorship agreements 
and endorsements.109  This view of the right to publicity was also 
discussed in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Association,110 where the court stated that most celebrities with 
commercially valuable identities are well compensated for the 
activities that gave rise to their fame.111  Hence, according to that 
court, the right of publicity is not necessary to induce people to 
engage in activities leading to fame and public notoriety.112 
C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. and Cardtoons held 
that First Amendment considerations outweighed right to publicity 
actions, with Cardtoons in particular taking a critical view of the 
utilitarian justifications for a right to publicity action.113  This may 
represent a judicial trend away from the broad application of the 
right of publicity, such as in the Carson and White cases, in favor 
of narrowing application of the right. 
III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Once the law designates something as property, the traditional 
“bundle of rights” attaches to that property.114  Those rights 
typically include the right to exclude, the right to possess, the right 
to use, and the right to transfer.115  However, the threshold question 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 111 Id. at 973–74. 
 112 Id. at 974. 
 113 See id. at 971–72; C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d at 823. 
 114 See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278–79 (2002) (noting that state law 
determines “which sticks are in a person’s bundle”). 
 115 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“[O]ne of the most 
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property—the 
right to exclude others.”); JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 25–26 (2d ed. 2012); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. 
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is whether to designate something as property in the first place.  
Under U.S. law this is usually a policy-based determination.116  
Therefore, it is imperative that the relevant underlying rationales or 
policy objectives be carefully examined.  Legal rights typically do 
not exist in a vacuum.  They exist to further both general117 and 
specific rationales.118  Additionally, the unintended consequences 
or externalities that result from any legal right create collisions 
with competing rights.119  Therefore, the rationales for the right of 
publicity must be critically explored to ascertain if the right 
furthers or satisfies the justifications advanced for it, and to 
determine how to treat competing policies. 
A. Labor Theory & Unjust Enrichment Justifications 
Allowing someone to keep the fruits of their efforts is a 
viscerally compelling justification for allowing a person—
 
of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 165 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (describing bundle of 
rights as including rights to possess, to use, to exclude and to dispose of property). 
 116 Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 165 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“For a variety of policy reasons, the 
law limits or even forbids the exercise of certain rights over certain forms of property.”); 
see also SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 115, at 1–8 (discussing various different 
theories used to justify existence of property law). See generally DUKEMINIER ET AL., 
supra note 46, at 50 (noting that utilitarian theory is dominant view of property today). 
 117 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971) (“Property rights serve human 
values.”); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10–13 (1972) (“[T]he legal 
protection of property rights has an important economic function: to create incentives to 
use resources efficiently.”). 
 118 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) 
(“[T]he ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into 
the public domain through disclosure.”); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that trademarks identify goods and 
services to consumers); Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 
HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 69 (1997) (arguing that intellectual property laws are based on 
policy that granting property rights to authors and inventors maximizes incentives to 
pursue creative endeavors). 
 119 See generally Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (“The Patent Clause [U.S. CONST. art 
I, § 8, cl. 8] . . .  reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the 
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in 
the ‘Progress of Science and the useful Arts.’”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON 
COPYRIGHT § 1.14, at 1:41–1:42 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing balance between providing 
enough rights to incentivize creators with maximizing public benefit from such creations 
in context of copyright law); HOWARD C. ANAWALT, IDEA RIGHTS: A GUIDE TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (2011) (noting conflict between intellectual property rights 
and the benefits of competition and the free flow of information). 
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especially a celebrity—to control the commercial use of his or her 
persona.120  The main reason the name or likeness of a celebrity is 
used in a commercial context is to gain an economic advantage 
from the association with a celebrity.121  For example, famous 
sports personalities are used to sell products because the use of 
such a person to pitch a product to the public can positively affect 
the public’s perception of the product, which can translate into 
increased sales.122  However, it is typically the celebrity that 
invested the time and effort into becoming well known, so it can be 
argued that the advertiser should pay for using that celebrity 
status.123  It can be further argued that celebrity status is merely a 
raw material used by an advertiser to sell a product, much like a 
musician uses an instrument created by a third party to make 
music.  Even though the musician may create music that has 
independent economic value, he or she must still pay the person 
who created the musical instrument for the time and effort utilized 
to make the instrument. 
 
 120 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th 
Cir. 1996). See generally Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 
835 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The theory of the right [of publicity] is that a celebrity’s identity 
can be valuable in the promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be 
protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.”). 
 121 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:31 at 47–49 (discussing empirical evidence that 
shows celebrity product endorsement can alter consumer perception of a product); see 
also Leah W. Feinman, Celebrity Endorsements in Non-Traditional Advertising: How the 
FTC Regulations Fail to Keep Up with the Kardashians, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 101 (2011) (“Celebrity endorsements can improve brand 
recognition and recall . . . .”); Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Roobina Ohanian, Recent Trends 
in the Law of Endorsement Advertising: Infomercials, Celebrity Endorsers and 
Nontraditional Defendants in Deceptive Advertising Cases, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 650 
(1991) (describing how celebrity endorsements give credibility to products). See 
generally C. ROBERT CLARK & IGNATIUS J. HORSTMANN, A MODEL OF ADVERTISING 
FORMAT COMPETITION: ON THE USE OF CELEBRITIES IN ADS (2009), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1333208 (last visited October 16, 2012) (discussing value 
of celebrity endorsements in advertising).  
 122 The importance of endorsements by sports figures has reached the point where many 
top athletes earn far more from endorsements than from playing sports. See Laura Lee 
Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Professional Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 10 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 23, 23 (1999). 
 123 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974–75. 
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Basic fairness is another theory that has been asserted for 
treating the value of a person’s persona as a type of property.124  
Arguably, fairness should support applying the property label to a 
celebrity’s identity because he or she invested the time and effort 
in creating its economic value.125  Therefore, unauthorized third 
party use would amount to the third party free riding on the 
economic value of the celebrity’s efforts without paying for what is 
used.  An unjust enrichment theory would provide legal support for 
an action based on unfairness.126 
Despite the appeal of a labor theory and an unjust enrichment 
theory, property rights are often subject to uncompensated 
limitations based on the public interest.127  Resale restrictions 
apply to food, firearms, pharmaceuticals, alcoholic beverages, and 
flammable materials.128  Similarly, real property rights can be 
subject to uncompensated limitations.129  For example, zoning law, 
nuisance law, historic preservation laws, and endangered species 
laws can limit or restrict many potential uses of real property with 
significant negative economic effects.130  Intellectual property 
rights are also subject to limitations.131  The fair use doctrine 
immunizes certain activities from copyright infringement.132  The 
use of valuable trademarks in comparative advertising133 or news 
 
 124 See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:2 at 88–94 (discussing fairness as a 
justification for the right of publicity in the context of a natural rights theory). 
 125 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975 (“People deserve the right to control and profit from the 
commercial value of their identities because, quite simply, they’ve earned it.”). See 
generally MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:2 at 88–94 (discussing fairness as a justification 
for the right of publicity in the context of a natural rights theory). 
 126 See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) 
(finding that unjust enrichment is rationale for right of publicity); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 
976 (noting that one justification for right of publicity is prevention of unjust 
enrichment); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (noting 
that right of publicity prevents unjust enrichment). 
 127 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 165–66 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, 
J., dissenting).  
 128 Id. at 165 n.7 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
 129 Id. at 165–66. 
 130 Id. at 165 n.6. 
 131 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970–71 (discussing limitations placed on intellectual property 
rights with regards to parody, criticism, and comment). 
 132 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 133 “It is well settled that the use of a trademark in a truthful comparative advertisement 
to refer to another company is entirely permissible.” SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 
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reporting134 is not actionable by the trademark owner.  Likewise, 
property rights based on the right of publicity should also be 
subject to appropriate policy based restrictions like other forms of 
property. 
B. Utilitarian Justification 
Today, commentators135 and courts136 view the right of 
publicity as a species of intellectual property law.  Accordingly, it 
makes sense to apply the underlying justification for intellectual 
property law to the right of publicity.  Intellectual property law, 
like property law generally, is typically justified under a utilitarian 
theory.137  The underlying policy justification for intellectual 
property law is a desire to benefit society generally by encouraging 
creativity and innovation in its many forms.138  The granting of 
property rights is not the ultimate goal.  Instead, granting such 
rights is viewed as a method of incentivizing individuals and 
enterprises to spend time, money, and effort on creative and 
innovative endeavors that ultimately enrich the public.139  Hence, 
granting property rights would be inconsistent with this 
 
2, § 31.2.2 at 743; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (excluding use of 
trademark in comparative advertising as actionable for trademark dilution). 
 134 CRAIG ALLEN NARD, MICHAEL J. MADISON, MARK P. MCKENNA & DAVID W. 
BARNES, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1115 (3d ed. 2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)(3)(B) (excluding use of trademark in news reporting as actionable for trademark 
dilution). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (codifying fair use defense to 
trademark infringement). 
 135 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:3 at 3; SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 2, 
§ 1.1 at 1. 
 136 See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003); see 
also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (noting that the 
goal of right of publicity action is closely analogous to the purpose of patent and 
copyright law, which is to encourage creativity by allowing person to economically 
benefit from his or her endeavors).   
 137 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 46, at 50 (utilitarian theory is dominant view of 
property); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 531, 542 (2005) (noting most scholars rely on a utilitarian property theory); see also 
Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 65 
(1997) (intellectual property law based on utilitarian policy that granting property rights 
to inventors and authors maximizes incentives to engage in creative activities). 
 138 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 139 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th 
Cir. 1996); see also Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576–77. 
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justification if it did not incentivize action that furthered the 
ultimate goal of providing societal benefits.140 
The determinative question then becomes whether the right of 
publicity is necessary to incentivize individuals to pursue the 
economic benefits of fame and fortune.  Celebrity compensation 
provides incentives for individuals to strive for fame in various 
endeavors.141  Professional athletes can earn far more than the 
average person even if they are only moderately successful.142  In 
some industries the mere potential for above-average 
compensation can provide adequate incentives.  For example, 
minor league baseball players earn subsistence salaries while 
pursuing a mere chance to play major league ball with its attendant 
high salaries and perks.143  Median salaries for entertainers are 
likewise minimal but many still pursue fame and fortune in the 
industry.144  Typically, an individual will not have the opportunity 
to gain an economic benefit from his or her right of publicity until 
they have become a celebrity,145 so the rewards of becoming a 
celebrity are sufficient inducement to pursue such a path. 
 
 140 In C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007), the court denied a right of publicity action for 
professional baseball players, in part, because it concluded the right of publicity was not 
necessary to incentivize baseball players to excel.  
 141 See Gloria Franke, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: Will One Test 
Ever Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 955 (2006). 
 142 See, e.g., Jarrett Bell, Money Management a Difficult Lesson for NFL’s Rookie 
Class, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 2010, 7:37 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
sports/football/nfl/2010-07-29-nfl-rookies-money-bankruptcy_N.htm; MLBPA INFO 
Frequently Asked Questions, MLBPLAYERS.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/info/ 
faq.jsp#minimum (last visited July 26, 2012) (noting that minimum salary for a major 
league baseball player in 2011 was $480,000). 
 143 See Garrett Broshuis, Playing for Peanuts, BASEBALL AMERICA (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/minors/season-preview/2010/269689.html.  
 144 See, e.g., Musicians and Singers: Occupational Outlook Handbook, United States 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/ Entertainment-and-
Sports/ Musicians-and-singers.htm (demonstrating that the median wage in 2009 for 
singers and musicians was $22.36 per hour with full-time employment being rare). 
 145 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572 (1977); see 
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834–35 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(arguing that the “right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest of 
celebrities in their identities” and the right of privacy and the right of publicity protect 
fundamentally different rights, with the former protecting the “right to be let alone” and 
C03_BECKERMAN-RODAU (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2012  2:13 PM 
2012] RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 153 
Furthermore, if the right of publicity is a species of intellectual 
property law, it must be balanced against competing interests.  
Therefore, the right of a person to retain the economic value of his 
or her public persona is not unlimited.146  It must be balanced 
against the competing goals of promoting competition, insuring the 
existence of a robust public domain, and protecting First 
Amendment rights of free expression. 
Judge Alex Kozinski, in an opinion highly critical of the White 
case, stated the following in emphasizing the importance of 
balancing the right of publicity against maintaining a vigorous 
public domain: 
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as 
underprotecting it.  Creativity is impossible without 
a rich public domain.  Nothing today, like nothing 
since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like 
science and technology, grows by accretion, each 
new creator building on the works of those who 
came before.  Overprotection stifles the very 
creative forces it’s supposed to nurture.147 
In Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Association,148 
the court was required to balance First Amendment rights in the 
form of parodies against the right of publicity.  The court had to 
determine if parody baseball trading cards, which referred to active 
professional baseball players, violated the players’ right of 
publicity.149  The court, which concluded that the right of publicity 
was not violated, stated: 
One of the primary goals of intellectual property 
law is to maximize creative expression.  The law 
attempts to achieve this goal by striking a proper 
balance between the right of a creator to the fruits of 
his labor and the right of future creators to free 
 
the latter protecting “the celebrity’s pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of 
his identity”); see also Franke, supra note 141, at 952. 
 146 See Leaffer, supra note 46, at 1363. 
 147 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting to order rejecting en banc rehearing). 
 148 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 149 Id. at 962. 
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expression.  Underprotection of intellectual property 
reduces the incentive to create; overprotection 
creates a monopoly over the raw material of 
creative expression.  The application of the . . . 
publicity rights statute to . . . [parody baseball] 
trading cards presents a classic case of 
overprotection.  Little is to be gained, and much 
lost, by protecting [the baseball players’] right to 
control the use of [the players’] identities in parody 
trading cards.  The justifications for the right of 
publicity are not nearly as compelling as those 
offered for other forms of intellectual property, and 
are particularly unpersuasive in the case of celebrity 
parodies.  The cards, on the other hand, are an 
important form of entertainment and social 
commentary that deserves First Amendment 
protection.150 
Judge Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in the Carson cases 
approves of the existence of a right of publicity action to protect 
the economic value of a celebrity’s persona.151  However, Judge 
Kennedy is troubled by extending the scope of the right beyond 
specific individual identifiers such as name or likeness.152  She 
fears that such a broad view of the right of publicity has the 
potential to interfere with the public domain by preventing certain 
common words or phrases from being freely used by the public.153  
She also noted that “commercial and competitive interests are 
potentially compromised by an expansive approach to right of 
publicity.”154  Finally, Judge Kennedy opines that the right of 
 
 150 Id. at 976. 
 151 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 152 “I do not believe that the common law right of publicity may be extended beyond an 
individual’s name, likeness, achievements, identifying characteristics or actual 
performances, to include phrases or other things which are merely associated with the 
individual . . . .” Id.  Judge Alex Kozinski shares the same view as Judge Kennedy. See 
White, 989 F.2d at 1514. 
 153 Carson, 698 F.2d at 837.  
 154 Id. at 840. 
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publicity may be preempted by federal copyright law,155 but even 
if preemption is not applicable, First Amendment freedom of 
speech concerns should limit broad interpretation of the right of 
publicity.156 
Although most judicial decisions have rejected a copyright 
preemption argument,157 the First Amendment has been generally 
recognized by courts as a constitutional limitation on the right of 
publicity.158  As a general rule, the reporting of newsworthy 
information159 or information of great public interest,160 as well as 
parodies,161 are insulated by the First Amendment from a right of 
publicity action.  Despite agreement that the First Amendment can 
 
 155 Id. at 839–40. 
 156 Id. at 841. 
 157 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:50 at 832 (noting the majority rule is that federal 
copyright law does not preempt state-based right of publicity); see also Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 
225–26 (2002) (noting that few courts have found right of publicity preempted by 
copyright law). 
 158 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 567–68 (1977) 
(discussing interaction of state-based right of publicity action and First Amendment); 
C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that First Amendment rights outweighed right of 
publicity); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) (“There is 
an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of expression 
under the First Amendment.”); see also Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th 
Cir. 2003).  
 159 See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFB Publ’g Group, 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(finding First Amendment freedom of the press outweighs right of publicity with regard 
to publication of newsworthy information); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 790, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding the right of publicity does not bar reporting 
newsworthy facts); see also Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, No. C 299149, 1986 WL 215081, 
at *1017 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 3, 1986) (describing how “newsworthy matters or matters 
of legitimate public interest” are outside the domain of the right of publicity).  Some right 
of publicity statutes provide exceptions for conduct such as reporting news or information 
about public affairs. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 
95 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 307, 311–13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
 160 See, e.g., Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding 
a public interest defense can bar a right of publicity action); Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. 
Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (describing how a 
right of publicity action may be barred if it “conflicts with the free dissemination of 
thoughts, ideas, newsworthy events, and matters of public interest”). 
 161 See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (holding First Amendment right to parody 
athlete outweighs athlete’s right of publicity action). 
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limit the right of publicity, courts have developed a variety of tests 
for drawing a line between the property rights encapsulated in the 
right of publicity and the free speech rights enshrined in the First 
Amendment.162  As suspected, these tests are not always 
consistent.163  Moreover, some courts find First Amendment 
interests outweigh the property rights under the right of publicity 
without articulating any specific test.164 
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc.,165 the 
defendant made a charcoal drawing of the Three Stooges that he 
sold on t-shirts and as lithographs.166  Although the drawings were 
original artistic works created by defendant, they were very lifelike 
in nature.167  Therefore, selling them on shirts and as lithographs 
clearly implicated the right of publicity.168  Nevertheless, 
according to the court, the underlying property interest embodied 
in the right of publicity was inseparable from the defendant’s First 
Amendment right to freely create original artistic works.169  The 
California Supreme Court, noting the conflict between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment, articulated what was to 
become known as the transformative use test: 
 
 162 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 769 (D.N.J. 2011) (describing how 
courts use several balancing tests to determine if First Amendment free speech rights 
limit a right of publicity action); see also Franke, supra note 141, at 963 (describing how 
the transformative test and the predominant use test are most commonly used tests); W. 
Webner & Leigh Lindquist, Transformation: The Bright Line Between Commercial 
Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, 37 AKRON L. REV. 171, 185 (2004) (quoting 
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 806 (Cal. 2001)) (noting that 
state’s interest in protecting labor of performing artist must be balanced against 
promoting free expression). 
 163 See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 50, § 6G[4][c] at 758 (noting recent case law 
inconsistent with regard to interaction of First Amendment and right of publicity); see 
also Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 774 (describing how general consensus does not exist with 
regard to how to balance First Amendment free speech rights with the property rights 
protected by right of publicity). 
 164 See, e.g., C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 165 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 166 Id. at 800–01. 
 167 Id. at 811. 
 168 Id. at 802. 
 169 Id. at 802–03. 
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A California statute grants the right of publicity to 
specified successors in interest of deceased 
celebrities, prohibiting any other person from using 
a celebrity’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness for commercial purposes without the 
consent of such successors.  The United States 
Constitution prohibits the states from abridging, 
among other fundamental rights, freedom of speech.  
In the case at bar we resolve a conflict between 
these two provisions. . . . We formulate . . . what is 
essentially a balancing test between the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity based on 
whether the work in question adds significant 
creative elements so as to be transformed into 
something more than a mere celebrity likeness or 
imitation.170 
The transformative use test171 is borrowed in part from the fair 
use test utilized in copyright law172 to determine when the 
perpetrators of certain infringing actions should be exempted from 
liability in light of First Amendment concerns.173  Application of 
the test in this case was relatively easy because defendant’s 
drawings were very lifelike renderings of the Three Stooges.174  
The difficult issue for future courts will be to determine how 
transformative a work must be to outweigh a right of publicity 
claim because this test is inherently vague and uncertain.175 
 
 170 Id. at 799. 
 171 See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011) (noting that, under the transformative use test, the question is whether the work at 
issue has been so transformed that it is predominantly defendant’s expression rather than 
merely a celebrity likeness); see also Donna Cunningham, Political Parody Collides with 
the Right of Publicity: The Case of the Bobblehead Governor, 21 MIDWEST L.J. 119, 
126–27 (2007) (discussing the transformative use test). 
 172 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 173 See Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 807–08 (rejecting wholesale adoption of the 
fair use test while adopting the first factor of the four-factor fair use test, which requires 
an analysis of the “the purpose and character of the use” and is codified in the copyright 
law at 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)). 
 174 Id. at 811. 
 175 See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 903, 916–25 (2003) (critical discussion of the transformative use test). 
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In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,176 a professional hockey player 
named Tony Twist objected to defendant’s use of a comic book 
character sharing his name.177  The Missouri Supreme Court, 
noting the conflict between the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment,178 indicated that a balancing test should be used to 
determine which right prevails.179  The court rejected the 
transformative use balancing test adopted by the California 
Supreme Court in Comedy III Productions, Inc. in favor of the 
predominant use test.180  Under this test, the court sought to 
determine whether the predominant use of the Mr. Twist’s identity 
in defendant’s comic books sought to exploit the commercial value 
of his identity, triggering a right of publicity action181 or whether 
the predominant use was as expressive content—such as a 
parody—which is constitutionally-protected speech that trumps the 
right of publicity.182  The court concluded: 
[T]he . . . reference to Twist, though a literary 
device, has very little literary value compared to its 
commercial value.  On the record here, the use and 
identity of Twist’s name has become predominantly 
a ploy to sell comic books and related products 
rather than an artistic or literary expression, and 
under these circumstances, free speech must give 
way to the right of publicity.183 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.184 involved an artist, Rick 
Rush, who created paintings of famous athletes and sporting 
events.185  The defendant was authorized to produce and sell 
limited edition prints made from Mr. Rush’s paintings.186  
 
 176 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 177 Id. at 365. 
 178 See id. at 372 (noting that this conflict has been a difficult issue and that courts have 
generally struggled with it). 
 179 See id. at 373–74 (discussing the different balancing tests available). 
 180 See id. at 374. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 375. 
 183 Id. at 374. 
 184 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 185 Id. at 918. 
 186 Id. 
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Specifically, these were prints of a painting commemorating the 
famous golfer Tiger Woods’ victory at the Masters Tournament in 
Augusta, Georgia.187  In contrast to the drawing in Comedy III 
Productions, Inc., which only contained a realistic likeness of the 
Three Stooges,188  the print included more than a mere likeness of 
Mr. Woods.  It included other individuals and references to the 
Masters Tournament and the Augusta golf course on which it is 
played.189  Overall it portrayed a historic event in the sports 
world.190  The court noted the tension between the right of 
publicity and the First Amendment191 and identified the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition192 as providing the test 
for balancing these rights.193  Under this approach, the First 
Amendment prevails if a person’s identity is primarily used to 
communicate information or ideas such as for news reporting, 
biographies, novels, plays, or movies.194  In contrast, the right of 
publicity prevails if a person’s name or likeness is used solely to 
attract attention to a work that is unrelated to the person, or if the 
work at issue contains substantially false information.195  The court 
also noted that despite its reliance on the Restatement, the 
transformative use test utilized in Comedy III Productions, Inc. 
could be helpful, though not controlling.196  Ultimately, the court 
concluded that the artist’s First Amendment rights outweighed Mr. 
Woods’ right of publicity.197  This result seems consistent with 
both the Restatement and the transformative use test since the artist 
added substantial original work to the painting such that it was 
significantly transformative.198  The painting was clearly 
communicating that Mr. Woods won the Masters Tournament, 
 
 187 Id. 
 188 See id. at 936. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 931. 
 192 See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–48. 
 193 ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 931. 
 194 Id. at 930. 
 195 Id. at 930–31. 
 196 See id. at 936. 
 197 Id. at 938. 
 198 Id.  
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which is a historic event in the sports world and thus argues for a 
broader range of permissible uses of an individual’s persona.199 
Additionally, other policy concerns outweigh application of the 
labor and unjust enrichment theories in intangible property law.  
Under the common law, a novel idea is generally not legally 
protectable from unauthorized third party use unless it is a “well-
developed” idea.200  This requirement is typically described as the 
concrete or concreteness requirement.201  Under this approach, a 
purely abstract idea is usually not entitled to property protection 
regardless of its value or the effort entailed in developing it.202  
Some courts have even held that an abstract idea cannot be the 
subject of a contractual agreement.203 
An identical result is reached under patent law.204  There, an 
abstract idea is likewise not eligible to be considered for utility 
patent protection.205  For example, even if a researcher spent years 
and millions of dollars developing a mathematical formula that 
describes previously unknown relationships in physics, it would 
not be eligible for patent protection206—even if the potential 
economic value of the formula was significant.207  However, a 
 
 199 Id. 
 200 See Tate v. Scanlan Int’l, Inc., 403 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (legal 
protection only extended to ideas that are both novel and well-developed); see also 
Sellers v. Am. Broad. Co., 668 F.2d 1207, 1210 (11th Cir. 1982) (action for 
misappropriation of idea only allowed if idea is both novel and concrete).  
 201 Scanlan Int’l, Inc., 403 N.W.2d at 672 (concrete requirement satisfied if idea 
sufficiently complete so that it can be used without the need for any significant 
development before it can be implemented). 
 202 See Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663, 669 (Nev. 1975) (legal protection only 
extends to abstract ideas that are both novel and concrete). See generally Wrench LLC v. 
Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 460 (6th Cir. 2001) (typically ideas must be both novel 
and concrete in order to be protected as property). 
 203 See, e.g., Scanlan Int’l, Inc., 403 N.W.2d at 671 (idea must be both novel and 
concrete to be subject of a contract). 
 204 See generally Jennings v. Brenner, 255 F. Supp. 410 (D.D.C. 1966) (a contract 
cannot consist of an abstract idea). 
 205 Id. at 412. 
 206 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“Einstein could not patent 
his celebrated law that E=mc;2 nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.”). 
 207 See Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 316 U.S. 364, 384 (1942). See 
Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309 (“The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas 
have been held not patentable.”); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
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machine that utilizes the formula to complete a specific task would 
be patent-eligible.208 
By contrast, copyright law denies protection to all ideas and 
information, not just abstract ideas.209  This is reflected in the 
delineation between ideas, which go unprotected, and copyright 
law’s protection of original means of expressing ideas.210  A news 
organization, for example, may spend substantial money 
maintaining an overseas news bureau.  Based on substantial 
expenditures, the news organization publishes a series of articles 
that reveal previously secret information about governmental 
activities.  Anyone is free to use the information disclosed in the 
articles even though such use potentially amounts to free riding or 
unjust enrichment.211  Copyright law does not protect such 
information.212  Only the form of expression of the information in 
the articles is protected.213  Therefore, a third party could not copy 
the articles verbatim, but they could extract and use the 
information in the articles.214  A competing news organization may 
even be able to freely use the information in its original news 
stories.215 
 
2005) (basic scientific discoveries that are only useful for engaging in further research are 
ineligible for patent protection). 
 208 See generally Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) (“An idea 
of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful 
is.”). 
 209 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 
F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986) (ideas not protected by copyright).  
 210 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (copyright law protects expression of 
an idea but not the idea itself); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 
738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971) (copyright only protects form of expression of idea but not idea 
itself). 
 211 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See id. at 353–54.  Although copyright law may be inapplicable in this situation, the 
Supreme Court did enjoin one news-gathering organization from free riding on the work 
of a competing news-gathering organization under a common law unfair competition 
theory generally referred to as a misappropriation action. Int’l News Serv v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).  However, this theory has rarely been successful in 
subsequent disputes. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Ideas and the Public Domain: 
Revisiting INS v. AP in the Internet Age, 1 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW 1, 15 
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Trademark law recognizes and protects investments in 
marketing and branding efforts that infuse a trademark with a 
substantial mental association.216  For example, the law protects 
the mental association that exists when a consumer sees the word 
“Coke” or “Toyota” on an appropriate product.217  Nevertheless, in 
the interest of promoting competition, unauthorized use of a 
trademark is permitted in comparative advertising.218  
Unauthorized use of a trademark is also permitted for purposes of 
social commentary,219 parody,220 artistic expression,221 and news 
reporting222 consistent with First Amendment rights.  Finally, 
unauthorized third party commercial use of a trademark is 
generally permissible if such use does not result in a likelihood of 
confusion among the intended consumer group.223 
Likewise, trade secrets law does not rely exclusively on a labor 
or unjust enrichment theory for its justification.  Although it allows 
protection for a broad range of information that provides an 
economic advantage over competitors,224 it also allows free riding 
 
(2011) (critical discussion of International News Service advocating elimination of the 
misappropriation action). 
 216 See, e.g., Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 
1987) (trademark law protects property interest in a trademark). 
 217 See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresege Co., 316 U.S. 
203, 205 (1942) (“A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser 
to select what he wants, or what he had been led to believe he wants . . . .”). 
 218 See SSP Agric. Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite, Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 
1979) (using competitor’s trademark in a comparative advertisement is allowable absent 
consumer confusion or misrepresentations). 
 219 See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 220 See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 886 F.2d 490 
(2d Cir. 1989) (finidng the use of trademark in parody of Cliffs Notes study guide not 
actionable under trademark law). 
 221 See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1281 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (finding the use of trademarks in original paintings of college football players 
not actionable under trademark law). 
 222 Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect Trademarks, 
35 YALE J. INT’L L. 405, 413 (2010). 
 223 See Int’l Jenson, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 827 (9th Cir. 1993). 
See generally Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that trademark law protects consumers from confusion, but if a trademark enters 
the common vocabulary and becomes a cultural reference it is no longer serving a 
trademark function and First Amendment rights then trump trademark rights). 
 224 See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in 
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under certain circumstances.225  For example, a company may 
spend millions of dollars developing a new product line, but each 
individual product might sell for only a few hundred dollars.  A 
competitor could buy the product, reverse engineer it and, based on 
its findings, it could then manufacture and sell a copy of the 
product.226  This might allow the competitor to free ride by 
avoiding the costly research and development work done by the 
original company that created the product.  Such action is legally 
permissible despite the fact that it ultimately amounts to free 
riding.227 
The above approaches under the common law, patent law, 
copyright law, trademark, and trade secrets law may seem unfair 
from the perspective of a labor and unjust enrichment theory.  
Without negating the value of these theories, the question then 
becomes whether there are competing underlying policies that 
weigh against the labor and unjust enrichment theories.  In general, 
the importance of allowing abstract ideas and information to be 
part of the public domain traditionally has been viewed as a 
competing and superseding policy.228  Sometimes this policy is 
 
the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret 
to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”). 
 225 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995) (“The 
freedom to compete in the marketplace includes, in the absence of patent, copyright, or 
trademark protection . . . the freedom to copy the goods, methods, processes, and ideas of 
others.”). 
 226 Reverse engineering is the process of “starting with the known product and working 
backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture.” 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). 
 227 See id. (noting that reverse engineering is legally permissible under trade secrets 
law). 
 228 In White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1517 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), Judge Kozinski stated: 
[I]t may seem unfair that much of the fruit of a creator’s labor may be 
used by others without compensation.  But this is not some 
unforeseen byproduct of our intellectual property system; it is the 
system’s very essence.  Intellectual property law assures authors the 
right to their original expression, but encourages others to build 
freely on the ideas that underlie it.  This result is neither unfair nor 
unfortunate: It is the means by which intellectual property law 
advances the progress of science and art.  We give authors certain 
exclusive rights, but in exchange we get a richer public domain.  
Id. 
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found in the critical importance of the First Amendment freedom 
of speech rights, which must be strongly protected in a 
democracy.229  In the commercial context, the desire to promote 
competition may also provide justification for treating some things 
as part of the public domain and therefore denying them property 
protection.230  Finally, the importance of information to the public 
generally may sometimes outweigh giving private ownership to 
intangibles.231  Nevertheless, such concerns should never totally 
outweigh intangible property rights, which are also critical to the 
existence of both a democracy and a free enterprise economic 
system.232  The issue then becomes how to provide property 
protection for a person’s persona without overreaching and 
interfering with these competing concerns. 
IV. ASSOCIATION-BASED RELATIONSHIPS VS. CONFUSION-BASED 
RELATIONSHIPS 
As previously discussed, right of publicity actions can be 
viewed on a continuum that includes both confusion-based and 
association-based relationships.  Confusion-based relationships 
include situations where a person’s name or likeness is used in 
commercial advertising, creating a likelihood that consumers will 
 
 229 See U.S. v. Carrier, 672 F.2d 300, 305 (2d Cir. 1982) (free dissemination of ideas is 
an essential element of democracy). See also Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 
(1937) (Cardozo, J.) (noting freedom of thought and speech are indispensable to nearly 
every other form of freedom).  
 230 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) (“Freedom to 
engage in business and to compete for the patronage of prospective customers is a 
fundamental premise of the free enterprise system.”). 
 231 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (mathematical 
formulas such as E=mc2 or the discovery of a new mineral or plant are not patentable 
subject matter); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (discovery of new and 
useful mathematical formula not patent-eligible subject matter); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (scientific truth even if expressed as a mathematical formula not 
patentable); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1293(2012) (laws of nature, natural phenomena, mental processes, and abstract 
ideas not eligible for patent protection). Accord Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 
(2010).   
 232 See generally White, 989 F.2d at 1517 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting importance 
of balances built into intellectual property law between what a creator owns and what 
portion of such creations are free for everyone to use as part of the public domain). 
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believe the person endorses or approves of the advertised 
product.233  Typically, the use of the name or picture of a celebrity 
in an advertisement without any type of disclaimer will per se 
cause consumers to believe the person endorses or approves of the 
product in the advertisement.234  Such a result should be 
actionable.  In contrast, mere references that conjure associations 
with a person do not automatically create a likelihood that 
consumers will be confused as to whether the person endorses or 
approves of the product.235  However, if such likelihood is shown 
to exist, then a confusion-based action should be permitted.236 
Further along the continuum are association-based 
relationships where commercial advertising causes consumers to 
associate the product or the advertisement with a celebrity but such 
consumers do not believe the celebrity endorsed or approved of the 
advertised product.237  For example, in the previously discussed 
Carson case the court concluded that selling portable toilets with 
the advertising phrase “Here’s Johnny” could cause consumers to 
make an association with Mr. Carson even though consumers 
would not think he endorsed or was affiliated with the business in 
any way.238  Likewise, David Letterman has made his humorous 
top ten lists famous.239  As a result, using a top ten list in 
advertising could create a mental association with Mr. 
Letterman.240  For example, LexisNexis produced the following 
advertising brochure: 
 
 233 See e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 
1983). 
 234 See Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 627 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“When a 
public figure of Woody Allen’s stature appears in an advertisement, his mere presence is 
inescapably to be interpreted as an endorsement.”). 
 235 See generally ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that the Sixth Circuit has created an eight-factor test to determine the likelihood of 
confusion). 
 236 Id. at 925–26. 
 237 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 238 Carson, 698 F.2d at 836. 
 239 An archive of Mr. Letterman’s Top Ten lists is available at 
http://www.cbs.com/late_night/late_show/top_ten/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2012). 
 240 Numerous websites and books dedicated to top ten lists exist. See, e.g., The Top 
Tens, available at http://www.the-top-tens.com/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2012); Top Tenz, 
available at http://www.toptenz.net/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
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The above advertisement is likely to produce, at most, an 
association-based relationship with Mr. Letterman rather than a 
confusion-based relationship.  Such a relationship should not be 
barred by a potential right of publicity action. 
The following advertisement for a 2004 Michael Moore film241 
may have also created an association-based relationship—but not a 
confusion-based relationship—with Ray Bradbury, author of the 
famous book Fahrenheit 451.242  Nevertheless, this should not be a 
basis for a right of publicity action by Mr. Bradbury.  Likewise, 
President George W. Bush should not have a right of publicity 
action merely because his picture was used in an advertisement to 
commercialize a movie.  It is unlikely that consumers will believe 
President Bush would have endorsed a movie critical of his 
presidency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 241 HTTP://WWW.FAHRENHEIT911.COM/ABOUT/POSTER/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). See 
http://www.michaelmoore.com/books-films/fahrenheit-911 (last visited Oct. 7, 2012). 
 242 RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (1953). 
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Moreover, confusion-based relationships do not need 
protection via the right of publicity; such relationships are already 
protected generally by trademark and unfair competition law.243  
Today, the scope of subject matter protectable as a trademark or 
service mark is very broad.244  For example, it is possible for a 
celebrity to register his or her name as a trademark and/or service 
mark under federal trademark law.245  Unfair competition actions 
 
 243 See J. Thomas MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 28.14 (4th 
ed. 2012) (noting that falsity is not a necessary element of infringement of the right of 
publicity, where this could easily be proven via trademark infringement). 
 244 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (green-gold 
color of press pads used by dry cleaners can be a trademark); In re Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (pink color of fiberglass insulation 
recognized as a trademark); Registration No. 2,007, 624 (mark for goats on a roof of 
grass for restaurant services); Registration No. 3,155,702 (sensory or touch trademark 
registered for the feel of a velvet-textured covering on a bottle of wine); GOLDSTEIN & 
REESE, supra note 2, at 256–57 (three-dimensional product packages can be protected as 
trademarks); Douglas D. Churovich, Scents, Sense or Cents?; Something Stinks in the 
Lanham Act: Scientific Obstacles to Scent Marks, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 293, 294–
95 (2001) (discussing trademark registration of a scent that was applied to thread and 
yarn). See generally Gary Myers, Statutory Interpretation, Property Rights, and 
Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark Dilution, Trade Dress, 
and Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLA  J.L. & ARTS 241 (2000) (discussing 
expansion of trademark rights today).  
 245 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4), (f) (2006) (allowing surname to be registered as 
trademark provided it has acquired distinctiveness); see also Russell Jacobs, Recapturing 
Rareness: The Significance of Surname Rareness in Trademark Registration 
Determinations, 50 IDEA 395 (2010) (discussing registering names as trademarks).  The 
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are also permitted and have been broadly construed under federal 
trademark law such that they apply even in the absence of an 
existing trademark.246  Both trademark infringement actions and 
unfair competition actions, which are also available under state 
law, are premised on protecting the consuming public from actual 
or potential deception.247  As a general rule, the legal standard used 
in such actions under both federal and state law is whether a 
substantial number of people in the intended consumer market are 
likely to be confused with regard to some aspect or characteristic 
of the product or service being sold.248  This includes creating a 
likelihood that someone—typically a celebrity—endorses or 
approves of a product or service when in reality that is untrue.249  
Hence, any use of a celebrity’s name or likeness would be 
actionable as trademark infringement or unfair competition if 
members of the intended consumer market are likely to incorrectly 
believe the celebrity endorses or supports the product or services 
 
musicians Beyoncé Knowles and Jay-Z filed trademark application for the name of their 
daughter, Blue Ivy Carter. Although the trademark application has initially been rejected 
by the Patent and Trademark Office, it is still pending. See Roxanne Roberts & Amy 
Argetsinger, The Reliable Source, WASHINGTON POST (Feb 3, 2012, 1:39 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/reliable-source/post/blue-ivy-the-trademark-feds-
move-fast-on-rights-to-beyonce-and-jay-zs-babys-name/2012/02/03/gIQAOTDGnQ 
_blog.html. 
 246 See Kournikova v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., No. CV 02-3747 GAF, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25810, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2002) (“A celebrity may bring a false 
endorsement claim for the unauthorized use of her identity if such use is likely to confuse 
consumers as to the celebrity’s sponsorship or approval of the product.”).  See generally 
Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (unfair competition 
action under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) is a new federal tort what covers more than trademark 
infringement and it should be construed broadly to remedy unfair competitive actions). 
 247 See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 248 See Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 618 F.3d 441, 449 (4th Cir. 
2010) (“[T]he tests for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham 
Act are essentially the same as that for common law unfair competition . . . ; all focus on 
the likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods involved.”); see also Karl Storz 
Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2002) (test for 
trademark infringement is whether consumers will be likely to be confused as to source 
or origin of relevant product or service); Storball v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20455, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1993) (unfair competition claim 
based on false endorsement requires showing a likelihood that consumers will be 
confused “as to the origin, approval, or endorsement of the product”).  
 249 See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 243, § 28.15. 
C03_BECKERMAN-RODAU (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2012  2:13 PM 
2012] RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 169 
his name or likeness is associated with.250  This same standard 
should apply even if the name or likeness of the celebrity is not 
used, such as in the Carson case.251  The ultimate controlling issue 
should be whether consumers are likely to be confused. 
Therefore, neither trademark infringement nor unfair 
competition law would render the use of a person’s name or 
likeness actionable in the absence of any likelihood of consumer 
confusion.252  Typically, the line is drawn to support a robust 
public domain, to engender free competition, and to accommodate 
First Amendment free speech considerations.253  This means a 
certain amount of free riding must be tolerated without the ability 
to bring legal action barring it.254  For example, one common over-
the-counter painkiller is better known via its trademark or brand 
name, TYLENOL,255 than by its generic product name, 
acetaminophen or paracetamol.256  This is a consequence of 
substantial advertising and marketing expenditures by the maker of 
the TYLENOL brand of acetaminophen.257  Hence, some 
 
 250 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 1992).  
 251 See MCCARTHY, supra note 243, § 28.15. 
 252 See Kournikova v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., No. CV 02-3747 GAF, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 25810, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2002) (“A celebrity may bring a false 
endorsement claim for the unauthorized use of her identity if such use is likely to confuse 
consumers as to the celebrity’s sponsorship or approval of the product.”). 
 253 See generally White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1402 (9th Cir. 
1992) (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (noting that when protecting intellectual property, the 
court must balance competing interests between protecting the creation and investment of 
intellectual property while preventing monopolies that would inhibit creative 
expressions). 
 254 See generally White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting careful balances built into intellectual property 
law which allow the public to use things created by others). 
 255 See Too Much Acetaminophen over Time May Damage Liver, USA TODAY, Nov. 
23, 2011, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/story/health/ story/2011-11-
23/Too-much-acetaminophen-over-time-may-damage-liver/51369772/1. 
 256 See Acetaminophen, PUBMED HEALTH, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pubmedhealth/PMH0000521/ (last visited June 22, 2012) (for information on 
acetaminophen). 
 257 See Jerry Knight, Tylenol’s Maker Shows How to Respond to Crisis, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 11, 1982. See generally At 50, Tylenol Brand Still Gaining Steam, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9879888/ns/health-health_care/t/ 
tylenol-brand-still-gaining-steam/ (last visited June 22, 2012) (discussing success of 
brand). 
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competitors, as shown below, who are free to make and sell 
generic versions of acetaminophen, place labels on their products 
which inform consumers that their product is equivalent to or 
should be compared to TYLENOL.258 
 
 
Such conduct allows the above sellers to free ride on the value 
of the TYLENOL brand without the costs of creating the strong 
mental association with that brand.  However, as long as the 
labeling is true and it does not cause a likelihood of consumer 
confusion, such free riding is not actionable under unfair 
competition law, nor is it trademark infringement because it only 
creates an association-based relationship between the product and 
the TYLENOL brand.259  Despite any unjust enrichment from such 
free riding, it can be justified on the basis of enhancing 
competition among acetaminophen makers.260  Furthermore, 
 
 258 For Equate image see http://www.walmart.com/ip/Equate-Extra-Strength-Value-
Pack-Acetaminophen-Non-Aspirin/10324477 (last visited July 27, 2012); for Walgreens 
image see http://www.drugstore.com/walgreens-childrens-pain-reliever-acetaminophen-
meltaways-bubble-gum/qxp369209 (last visited July 27, 2012). 
 259 See SSP Agric. Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite, Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 
1979) (using competitor’s trademark in a comparative advertisement is allowable absent 
consumer confusion or misrepresentations). 
 260 See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1408 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(Alarcon, J., dissenting) (noting that when protecting intellectual property, the court must 
balance competing interests between protecting the creation and investment of 
intellectual property while preventing monopolies that would inhibit creative 
expressions). 
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prohibiting the generic makers from marking their product as being 
comparable or equivalent to TYLENOL would amount to barring 
truthful commercial speech.261 
The above types of association-based relationships should not 
be actionable.262  Under this approach, Mr. Carson could not have 
pursued a right of publicity action in the Carson case.263  Likewise, 
Ms. White would be unable to pursue a right of publicity action in 
the White case absent a showing that a confusion-based 
relationship existed which caused consumers to be likely to believe 
the advertisement’s use of a robot on a television game show set to 
sell Samsung products was endorsed by Ms. White.264 
Limiting the right of publicity to confusion-based relationships 
may render the cause of action redundant and therefore 
unnecessary because, as noted above, trademark law and unfair 
competition law generally already make such conduct actionable.  
Additionally, this approach allows application of the previously-
developed delineation in intellectual property law between 
marketplace conduct that is permissible, and conduct that is 
impermissible trademark infringement or unfair competition. 
The effect of this approach is actually limited because many 
right of publicity disputes involve confusion-based relationships, 
so a trademark or unfair competition theory could often have 
provided relief in lieu of the right of publicity.265  It is only conduct 
that would allow a right of publicity action for an association-
based relationship that would be eliminated. 
For example, Bette Midler was involved in a right of publicity 
action that involved a sound-alike singer imitating Ms. Midler’s 
voice without her permission in a Ford automobile commercial.266  
 
 261 See generally Leaffer, supra note 46, at 1364 (arguing a right of publicity action 
should be based on unfair competition or trademark theory rather than a property 
misappropriation theory). 
 262 Id. at 1373. 
 263 See supra text accompanying notes 56–75. 
 264 See supra text accompanying notes 76–92. 
 265 Id. at 1364. 
 266 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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The song involved—”Do You Want to Dance?”267—was protected 
via copyright and it was used pursuant to a license from the 
copyright owner.268  The company used the sound-alike singer 
after Ms. Midler refused an offer to participate in the 
commercial.269  The evidence established that the sound-alike 
singer sounded enough like Ms. Midler to cause some consumers 
to believe Ms. Midler performed for the commercial.270  This is an 
example of a confusion-based relationship that should be 
actionable under an unfair competition theory271 and possibly also 
 
 267 BETTE MIDLER, Do You Want to Dance?, on THE DIVINE MISS M (Atlantic Records 
1972). 
 268 Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. 
 269 Id. at 461. 
 270 Id. at 461–62. 
 271 However, the court appeared to deny an unfair competition action due to a lack of 
economic injury to Ms. Midler.  The court stated “we do not find unfair competition here.  
One-minute commercials of the sort the defendants put on would not have saturated 
Midler’s audience and curtailed her market.  Midler did not do television commercials.  
The defendants were not in competition with her.” Id. at 462–63.  Interestingly, Ms. 
Midler subsequently changed her mind and did a car commercial for Honda in 2011. See 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=GhyLD2tWcKU (last visited on June 25, 
2012).  The court’s requirement that Ms. Midler must be a competitor who suffers 
economic damages is contrary to other unfair competition actions, which frame the 
controlling issue as a question of whether consumers are likely to be confused. See, e.g., 
Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (one purpose of unfair 
competition action under federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), is to protect 
consumers from wide variety of untrue representations about goods and services provided 
in commerce).  Consequently, if a likelihood of consumer confusion exists with regard to 
whether Ms. Midler was actually singing in the commercial, then she should be able to 
assert unfair competition, and her remedy should be damages and possibly an injunction 
barring playing the commercial in the future. See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 
F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding singer Tom Waits successfully asserted an unfair 
competition claim for unauthorized use of a sound-alike in a radio commercial).  
Although the remedy available for unfair competition has traditionally been damages 
and/or injunctive relief, that may be different today following the Supreme Court 
decision eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).  In eBay, the Court 
overruled precedent which held that a patent owner was entitled to a permanent 
injunction against continuing infringement after a trial on the merits found infringement. 
Id. at 1840–41.  The Court held that a patent owner was entitled to damages but that 
injunctive relief was up to the discretion of the trial judge. Id. at 1839. See generally 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in 
Interpreting the Patent Law in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 165, 166 (2007) (critical analysis of the eBay decision).  Although the 
eBay decision arose in the context of a patent infringement dispute, its holding is not 
limited to patent law disputes. See Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, 
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under a trademark infringement action.272  Nevertheless, the court 
utilized a right of publicity theory and treated the sound of Ms. 
Midler’s voice as a pure common law property right.273  This gave 
her the right to control who used it without regard to 
countervailing considerations.274 
In a similar case, a singer who sounded like Tom Waits was 
used in a radio commercial to sell SalsaRio Doritos, a snack 
food.275  Like Ms. Midler, Mr. Waits is a well-known singer who 
had a policy of not doing commercials.276  In both cases, evidence 
of actual confusion existed.277  Based on the distinctive voice of 
Mr. Waits, which was captured by the sound-alike singer, a jury 
found liability under a right of publicity theory and a federal unfair 
competition theory.278  As for the federal unfair competition claim, 
 
The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205 (2012).  The trend in favor of damages in lieu of injunctive 
relief has also been seen in real property disputes.  For example, a permanent injunction 
was the traditional remedy for interference with the use and enjoyment of real property 
due to a finding that a neighboring landowner was engaged in a nuisance. See Boomer v. 
Atl. Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1970) (noting rule that 
injunction was traditional remedy for an ongoing nuisance); see also Morgan v. High 
Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682 (N.C. 1953) (remedy for nuisance was permanent 
injunction).  Nevertheless, some judicial decisions have awarded damages in lieu of a 
permanent injunction thereby allowing the unwanted condition to continue subject to 
payment for such conduct. See, e.g., Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873 (overruling the 
traditional remedy and allowing the party creating the nuisance to continue the activity 
upon payment of monetary damages for present and future nuisance).   
 272 In light of Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 171–73 (1995), 
almost anything that is source-indicating can be registered as a trademark today.  This 
includes music and other sounds that have been registered as trademarks under federal 
law. See, e.g., THE SOUND OF THE FAMOUS TARZAN YELL, Registration No. 2,210,506; see 
also Ride the Ducks, LLC v. Duck Boat Tours, Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269, 1274 (E.D. Pa. 
2005) (noting sound can be a trademark); Melissa E. Roth, Something Old, Something 
New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional 
Trademark Registrations, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 457, 469 (2005) (sound trademarks 
registerable in the United States). See generally Rita Heimes, Trademarks, Identity, and 
Justice, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 133, 137 (2011) (colors, sounds, smells, 
and product packaging can be trademarks). 
 273 Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. 
 274 Id. at 463–464. 
 275 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 276 Id. at 1097. 
 277 Id. at 1111. 
 278 Id. at 1096. 
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the court rejected any requirement that Mr. Waits be in 
competition with regard to the sale of Doritos.279  Instead, the court 
styled the claim as a false endorsement claim280 and upheld the 
jury’s finding that in light of all the circumstances “consumers 
were likely to be misled by the commercial into believing that 
[Mr.] Waits endorsed SalsaRio Doritos.”281  Interestingly, the court 
found some of the damages awarded for the right of publicity 
action and the unfair competition claim to be duplicative, so a 
portion of the damages were vacated.282 
In Allen v. National Video, Inc.,283 the defendant, a person who 
looked like the well-known filmmaker and actor Woody Allen, 
was used in advertisements to take advantage of his resemblance to 
Mr. Allen.284  Mr. Allen brought an action asserting unfair 
competition and violation of his right to publicity.285  The court 
declined to resolve the right of publicity action because it 
concluded that the dispute could be resolved under unfair 
competition law.286  The court held that an unfair competition 
action available under federal law287 should be broadly construed 
to protect consumers from misrepresentations about products and 
services made available in commerce.288  Additionally, the unfair 
competition action should cover unfair competitive practices that 
cause actual or potential consumer deception.289  The court 
enjoined use of defendant’s image in the advertisements at issue 
after finding a violation of the federal unfair competition statute.290  
The court’s holding rested on a finding that the advertisements 
 
 279 Id. at 1110. 
 280 Id. at 1106–11. 
 281 Id. at 1111. 
 282 Id. at 1112.  Nevertheless, the court upheld an award of $2.6 million that was 
comprised of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Id. at 1096. 
 283 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 284 Id. at 618. 
 285 Id. at 617, 632. 
 286 Id. at 625.  It should be noted that a right to publicity action in the relevant 
jurisdiction in this case—New York—was constrained by statute such that it was more 
narrowly applied than in other jurisdictions. Id. at 624 n.5. 
 287 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 288 Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 625. 
 289 Id.  
 290 Id. at 630. 
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would be likely to confuse consumers into believing that Mr. Allen 
was either appearing in the advertisements or that he endorsed or 
approved of the advertisement with defendant’s image.291  The 
court noted that it was relying on the well-established likelihood of 
confusion analysis utilized in federal trademark infringement 
actions292 because this analysis is “the heart of a successful 
claim”293 under both federal and state trademark infringement 
actions and even under state unfair competition law actions.294 
In Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,295 the owner of the 
intellectual property rights to the television show Cheers 
 
 291 Id. at 628–30. 
 292 This analysis requires the court to consider the following factors in deciding if a 
likelihood of confusion exists:  
1) the strength of plaintiff’s marks and name; 
2) the similarity of plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks;  
3) the proximity of plaintiff’s and defendant’s products; 
4) evidence of actual confusion as to source or sponsorship; 
5) sophistication of the defendant’s audience; and  
6) defendant’s good or bad faith. 
Id. at 627 (applying the above factors, the court substituted the likenesses of defendant 
and Mr. Allen for the references to marks in the factors).  Most courts apply the same or 
similar factors in analyzing likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft 
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) (factors considered in determining 
likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement action: strength of the mark; proximity 
of the goods; similarity of the marks; evidence of actual confusion; marketing channels 
used; type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and likelihood of expansion of the product 
lines); Naked Cowboy v. CBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23211, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 
2012) (factors considered in federal trademark infringement action and federal unfair 
competition action: the strength of plaintiff’s mark; the similarity of the parties’ marks; 
the proximity of the parties’ products in the marketplace; the likelihood that the prior user 
will bridge the gap between the products; actual confusion; the defendant’s good or bad 
faith in adopting the mark; the quality of defendant’s product; and the sophistication of 
the relevant consumer group); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 
1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 
833 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 293 Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 627 (quoting Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity 
Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 294 See id.; accord Food Scis. Corp. v. Nagler, No. 09-1798, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112072, at *5 (D.N.J. 2010). See generally Summit Entertainment, LLC v. B.B. Dakota 
Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151582, at *20 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (noting the same likelihood 
of confusion test applies to federal and state trademark infringement and unfair 
competition actions).  
 295 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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authorized the creation of airport bars that resembled the bar in the 
television show.296  Additionally, animatronic robotic figures that 
resembled Norm and Cliff, two characters on the show, were 
placed in the bars,297 although the figures were called Bob and 
Hank.298  George Wendt and John Ratzenberger were the actors 
who played the Norm and Cliff characters in the television 
show.299  They brought an action arguing that the use of the Bob 
and Hank robots in the bars violated their rights of publicity and 
their federal unfair competition rights300 despite the fact that the 
facial features of the robots were totally different than the facial 
features of Mr. Wendt and Mr. Ratzenberger.301  The appellate 
court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the action on a motion 
for summary judgment.302  The appellate court held that the right 
of publicity action involved factual questions that a jury must 
decide.303  Additionally, the appellate court, consistent with the 
decisions discussed above, held that the federal unfair competition 
action was a false endorsement claim304 that should be analyzed 
under the traditional test for likelihood of confusion305 to 
determine if consumers would believe, based on the robotic figures 
in the bars, that Mr. Wendt and Mr. Ratzenberger endorsed the 
airport bars based on the Cheers television show.306 
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that a person should 
have a legal cause of action when his or her persona is used 
commercially to create a confusion-based relationship between a 
 
 296 Id. at 809. 
 297 Id.  
 298 Id. at 811. 
 299 Id.  
 300 Id. at 809. 
 301 See id. (finding no similarity between the robots and Mr. Wendt and Mr. 
Ratzenberger and noting they had totally different facial features). 
 302 Id.  The case was subsequently settled and it is presumed Mr. Wendt and Mr. 
Ratzenberger were compensated in return for ending the litigation. See ERIC FREYFOGLE 
& BRADLEY KARKKAINEN, PROPERTY LAW: POWER, GOVERNANCE, AND THE COMMON 
GOOD 426 (2012). 
 303 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810–12. 
 304 Id. at 812. 
 305 Id.  
 306 See id. at 812–13 (“The issue is whether a consumer would be confused as to Wendt 
and Ratzenberger’s association with or sponsorship of [the airport] bars.”). 
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good or service and the person.  However, a cause of action should 
not typically be available if only an association-based commercial 
relationship is created.  This negates the need for the right of 
publicity cause of action in many contexts because an unauthorized 
confusion-based relationship is already actionable under an unfair 
competition or trademark infringement action. 
Additionally, commercial speech likely to confuse or mislead 
consumers is not typically entitled to First Amendment 
protection.307  Therefore, limiting the right of publicity to 
confusion-based relationships greatly minimizes the need for 
courts to resolve the difficult conflicts between the right of 
publicity, which usually involves commercial speech, and the First 
Amendment. 
Nevertheless, a right of publicity action may be viable in the 
limited context when a famous persona is involved. 
V. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND TRADEMARK DILUTION 
Dilution law provides an exception to the distinction between 
commercial conduct that creates a confusion-based relationship308 
and commercial conduct that merely creates an association-based 
relationship.309  It allows a cause of action for trademark dilution in 
situations where an infringement action is not viable.310  Dilution 
 
 307 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 802 (Cal. 2001). 
 308 A trademark infringement action represents a confusion-based relationship. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(2006) (providing for trademark infringement action under federal 
trademark law based on certain conduct that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive”). 
 309 See id. § 1125(c) (providing a federal cause of action for trademark dilution); see 
also 54 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 1124 (2012) (providing a state statutory cause of action for 
trademark dilution under Pennsylvania law).  Some states recognize a common law 
dilution action. See, e.g., Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 165 F.3d 419, 424 (6th Cir. 
1999) (“Ohio courts recognize a common law cause of action for dilution.”). 
 310 In contrast to trademark infringement actions, trademark dilution actions do not 
require any consumer confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (stating no actual or 
likelihood of confusion necessary for dilution under federal law).  In Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. 
Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 167 (4th Cir. 2012), the court noted that the purpose of 
trademark infringement law is to prevent consumer confusion but this is not the premise 
for dilution actions. See also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Clinical Data, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 604, 
606–07 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding consumer confusion not necessary for dilution under 
Massachusetts state dilution law). See generally I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 
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actions are based on the existence of an unauthorized association-
based commercial relationship.311  Arguably, a dilution action 
recognize a property right in a trademark per se, in contrast to 
trademark infringement law which typically only recognizes a 
property right in the mental association created in the minds of the 
intended consumers when they see a trademark affixed to a 
product.312  The broad range of protection provided by dilution is 
mitigated by a requirement that such a cause of action is only 
available for a limited number of trademarks313—only famous 
 
163 F.3d 27, 48–49 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing how dilution can occur absent any 
consumer confusion and even if non-competing goods are involved). 
 311 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), which states: 
[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or 
through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction 
against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has 
become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in 
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or 
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual 
economic injury. Id. (emphasis added). 
 312 See generally Matthew Slowik, Ahead of the Curve? The Effect of the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act of 2006 on the Federal Circuit, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 349, 362 (2008) 
(describing how many commentators concerned about dilution right becoming a per se 
property right in trademark). 
 313 In Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 169–
70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 
(9th Cir. 1999)), the court stated: 
[D]ilution is a cause of action invented and reserved for a select class 
of marks—those marks with such powerful consumer associations 
that even non-competing uses can impinge on their value.  Dilution 
causes of action, much more so than infringement and unfair 
competition laws, tread very close to granting “rights in gross” in a 
trademark.  In the infringement and unfair competition scenario, 
where the less famous a trademark, the less the chance that 
consumers will be confused as to origin, a carefully-crafted balance 
exists between protecting a trademark and permitting non-infringing 
uses.  In the dilution context, likelihood of confusion is irrelevant.  If 
dilution protection were accorded to trademarks based only on a 
showing of inherent or acquired distinctiveness, we would upset the 
balance in favor of over-protecting trademarks, at the expense of 
potential non-infringing uses.  
 We view the famousness prong of both dilution analyses [i.e., 
under federal law and California law] as reinstating the balance—by 
carefully limiting the class of trademarks eligible for dilution 
protection, Congress and state legislatures granted the most potent 
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trademarks are entitled to dilution protection.314  “Famous” 
trademarks are, quite simply, marks that are widely known by the 
general public.315  Additionally, the traditional remedy permitted is 
injunctive relief316—in contrast to trademark infringement law, 
which allows both monetary damages and injunctive relief.317  This 
dilution action can be viewed as an attempt to protect the 
trademark owner’s investment in his or her mark, when the 
investment has resulted in the trademark becoming very strong and 
widely known to consumers.318 
By analogy, the analysis that justifies a trademark dilution 
action should apply to a right of publicity action.  Only celebrities 
who have become famous (in the trademark law sense that they are 
widely known by the general consuming public) should be able to 
assert a right of publicity action based on showing an unauthorized 
association-based commercial transaction.319  A lesser-known 
 
form of trademark protection in a manner designed to minimize 
undue impact on other uses.  
 Therefore, to meet the “famousness” element of protection 
under the dilution statutes, “a mark [must] be truly prominent and 
renowned.” 
Id. 
 314 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006); see also Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning 
LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that whether a trademark is famous is 
a threshold question for purposes of a federal dilution action). 
 315 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“A mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the 
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or 
services of the mark’s owner.”). 
 316 See Greater Lansing Ass’n of Realtors v. Mentzer-Amundson, No. 210504, 2000 
Mich. App. LEXIS 1236, at *18 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) 
(stating the remedy for dilution under federal law is injunctive relief).   
 317 See id. §§ 1114, 1116 (permitting damages for trademark infringement and allowing 
injunctive relief for trademark infringement). 
 318 Christopher R. Perry, Trademarks as Commodities: The “Famous” Roadblock to 
Applying Trademark Dilution Law in Cyberspace, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1127, 1130–31 
(2000) (noting that the purpose of trademark infringement action is to protect consumers 
from being confused but purpose of trademark dilution action is to protect investment of 
trademark owner in famous trademark). 
 319 Disagreement exists with regard to whether a right of publicity action is available to 
everyone or only to celebrities.  The leading commentator on the right to publicity 
believes all people should have the right. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:3 at 205–06.  
However, not all commentators agree. See id. §§ 4:14–16 at 219–26.  Likewise, judicial 
decisions are also split. See Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12479, at *14–15 (S.D.W.Va. 2008). Compare, e.g., Donchez v. Coors Brewing 
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celebrity would be limited to asserting a trademark infringement or 
unfair competition action based on an unauthorized confusion-
based commercial transaction.  This would enable  a celebrity who 
has invested sufficient time, energy, and money to become widely 
known to the general public to protect that investment. 
VI. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Courts generally disagree on the prima facie elements of a 
common law right of publicity action.320  However, the leading 
commentator states the following elements: 
 
Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2004) (indicating right of publicity action not 
available to a non-celebrity), with KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 713, 717 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (indicating California right of publicity statute not limited to 
celebrities). 
 320 See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that under California law, prima facie elements are “(1) the defendant’s use of 
plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s . . . [identity] to defendant’s 
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury”); 
Blair v. Nev. Landing P’ship, 859 N.E.2d 1188, 1191–92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (stating that 
under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show “an appropriation of one’s name or likeness, 
without one’s consent, for another’s commercial benefit”); Brasel v. The Hair Co., 976 
So. 2d 390, 392 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that under Mississippi law, “a plaintiff 
must show that the defendant: (1) appropriated his name or likeness, (2) without consent, 
(3) for use in a commercial enterprise”); Arnold v. Treadwell, No. 283093, 2009 WL 
2136909, at *4 (Ct. App. Mich. 2009) (stating that under Michigan law, “a plaintiff must 
prove (1) that she has a pecuniary interest or significant commercial value in her identity, 
and (2) that the defendants engaged in commercial exploitation of her identity”); Brill v. 
Walt Disney Co., 246 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (stating that under 
Oklahoma law, which adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition, “[o]ne who 
appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of privacy”); Henley v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 46 F. Supp. 
2d 587, 590 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (stating that under Texas law, prima facie elements are “(1) 
the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the value associated with 
it, and not in an incidental manner or for a newsworthy purpose; (2) the plaintiff can be 
identified from the publication; and (3) there was some advantage or benefit to the 
defendant”).  Likewise, the prima facie elements of a statutory right of publicity action 
also vary. See, e.g., Blair, 859 N.E.2d at 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (applying the Illinois 
statute which states: “[a] person may not use an individual’s identity for commercial 
purposes during the individual’s lifetime without having obtained previous written 
consent from the appropriate person or persons”); Molina v. Phoenix Sound Inc., 747 
N.Y.S.2d 227, 230 (App. Div. 2002) (stating that under New York’s statute, a plaintiff 
must show “(i) usage of plaintiff’s name, portrait, picture, or voice, (ii) with the state of 
New York, (iii) for purposes of advertising or trade, (iv) without plaintiff’s written 
consent”); Brill, 246 P.3d at 1103 (stating that under Oklahoma’s statute a plaintiff must 
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(1) Validity Plaintiff owns an enforceable right in 
the identity or persona of a human being; and 
(2) Infringement (A) Defendant, without 
permission, has used some aspect of identity or 
persona in such a way that plaintiff is identifiable 
from defendant’s use; and (B) Defendant’s use is 
likely to cause damage to the commercial value of 
that persona.321 
Typically, the third element above is presumed when some 
identifiable aspect of a person’s persona is used in a commercial 
context without permission.322  Usually, the traditional remedy of 
injunctive relief has been available.323  Recovery of damages 
generally requires proof of appropriate commercial injury.324 
Generally, when the name or likeness of a celebrity is used 
without permission with regard to the sale of a product or service 
an unfair competition claim can also be brought.325  Under federal 
 
establish “(1) Defendants knowingly used [plaintiff’s] name or likeness, (2) on products, 
merchandise or goods, (3) without [plaintiff’s] prior consent”). 
 321 MCCARTHY, supra note 1 § 3:2, at 120–21. 
 322 Id. § 3:2, at 122. 
 323 Id.  
 324 Id. § 3:2, at 122–23.  Typically, appropriate damages for a right of publicity action 
are commercial in nature.  For example, such damages could include the typical rate paid 
to a particular celebrity for use of his or her image in an advertisement, lost licensing 
opportunities, or the profits earned by an infringer. See generally id. §§ 11:30–11:35 at 
751–73 (detailed discussion of damages).  Nevertheless, in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 
F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992), the court noted that in an appropriate case, in addition to 
commercial damages, mental distress damages as a result of causing humiliation or 
embarrassment are recoverable.  And, punitive damages may also be awarded. Id. at 
1104–06. 
 325 Just as disagreement exists with regard to whether a right of publicity action is 
limited to celebrities, the same issue arises with regard to whether a false endorsement 
claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) is limited to celebrities. See, e.g., Uhlig LLC v. 
Shirley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31833, at *19 (D. S.C. 2011) (false endorsement action 
only available to celebrity). But see Arnold v. Treadwell, 642 F. Supp. 2d 723, 735 (E.D. 
Mich. 2009) (celebrity status not a requirement for false endorsement action).  A 
trademark infringement action may also be available if the celebrity has registered their 
name or other characteristic as a trademark or service mark.  The elements of a trademark 
infringement action are: (1) plaintiff must show ownership of the mark; and (2) consumer 
confusion is likely to result from defendant’s use of the mark. Rearden LLC v. Rearden 
Commerce Inc., 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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law such claims are typically referred to as false endorsement 
actions326 and require the plaintiff to establish: 
(1) its mark is legally protectable; 
(2) it owns the mark; 
(3) the defendant’s use of the mark to identify its 
goods or services is likely to create confusion 
concerning the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval 
of those goods or services.327 
Additionally, the mark must be used in interstate commerce328 
for the above action, although analogous state-based actions are 
available when purely intrastate commerce is involved.329 
Based on the statute330 and its judicial interpretation, the word 
mark is broadly construed to include “any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.”331  This includes 
both registered and unregistered marks as well as the use of a 
person’s name, likeness, or any other indicia that identifies the 
person.332  Often, any unauthorized reference to a celebrity in a 
commercial context will trigger a successful false endorsement 
claim because such use will generally make it likely that 
consumers believe the celebrity endorses or approves of the 
product or service and therefore a confusion-based association will 
exist.333  Of course, relying on a false endorsement action 
eliminates the small number of disputes where only an 
associational connection is made by consumers between the 
 
 326 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 327 Facenda v. Nat’l Football League, 542 F.3d 1007, 1014 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 328 Uhlig LLC v. Shirley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31833, at *19 (D. S.C. 2011). 
 329 See, e.g., Hubbs Mach. & Mfg. v. Brunson Instrument Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 
1019 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (stating that under Missouri law: “[u]nfair competition is a species 
of commercial hitchhiking which the law finds offensive, and, therefore, prohibits.  The 
law of unfair competition is but a reaffirmation of the rules of fair play.  It aims to effect 
honesty among competitors by outlawing all attempts to trade on another’s reputation—it 
gives the crop to the sower and not to the trespasser.  In so doing it strives to protect the 
buying public from deception”). 
 330 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
 331 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 332 Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1014; see also Amazon, Inc. v. Cannondale Inc., No. 99 N 
571, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17864, at *18–19 (D. Colo. 2000) (noting that celebrity 
persona is the mark at issue in a false endorsement claim). 
 333 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 939 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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product or service and the celebrity.334  Under this approach, an 
unfair competition action, such as a false endorsement action, can 
substitute for a right of publicity action whenever a confusion-
based association is created by a commercial use of a person’s 
persona.335 
Commercial use of a person’s persona should typically not be 
actionable if only an association-based connection exists between 
the person and the product or service he or she is associated with.  
This approach preserves a robust public domain where references 
to celebrities and others can be made freely as long as there is no 
likelihood of consumer marketplace confusion.  This result 
simplifies to some extent the difficulty of distinguishing between a 
person’s reputational interests and First Amendment free speech 
considerations since little justification exists for cloaking 
misleading and confusing commercial speech with First 
Amendment protection.336  However, one exception to this 
limitation can be gleaned or borrowed from trademark dilution 
law. 
Under dilution law,337 a limited number of trademarks that are 
deemed famous338 are granted an extra layer of protection.339  This 
protection arises from a commercial use that creates an 
association-based relationship even if no confusion-based 
relationship exists.340  To be famous, the trademark must be 
 
 334 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 
109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (denying motion for preliminary 
injunction because there was insufficient information to prove false endorsement even 
though there was an associational connection). 
 335 ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 924. 
 336 See generally Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) (finding that 
misleading or deceptive speech entitled to little of any First Amendment protection). 
 337 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (federal dilution).  State dilution statutes also exist. See, e.g., 
FLA. STAT. § 495.151 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (2012). 
 338 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 339 See id. 
 340 See Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 170 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that likelihood of confusion is not relevant in a dilution 
action).  Federal law makes a dilution action available “regardless of the presence or 
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).  Dilution actions apply to a very limited class of trademarks that 
have such strong consumer associations that unauthorized non-competing uses by a third 
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“widely recognized by the general consuming public.”341  If a 
celebrity reaches this status, a right of publicity action should be 
available even if commercial use of the celebrity persona only 
creates an association-based relationship.  Arguably, this provides 
an extra level of legal protection for a limited number of 
celebrities, just as dilution law provides an extra level of protection 
for the limited number of trademarks that have attained an 
unusually high level of marketplace recognition. 
Admittedly, this approach will make it virtually impossible for 
non-celebrities to successfully assert an action because they will be 
unable to satisfy the famous requirement.  They will also be 
unlikely to demonstrate any likelihood of confusion as required by 
an unfair competition action.342  Nevertheless, non-celebrities 
would still have the option of asserting a right of privacy action in 
appropriate cases to protect their personas from public humiliation 
or emotional distress. 
Analogizing to unfair competition and trademark law allows 
courts to apply the rich body of precedent that exists in those areas 
of law.  This will create more certainty with regard to what are 
protectable property interests and what should be freely available 
in the public domain.  Finally, it will allow the right of publicity to 
fit within the genus of intellectual property law by applying the 
same balancing of competing interests that is endemic to the other 
species of intellectual property law. 
CONCLUSION 
The right of publicity represents the newest species of 
intellectual property. However, its parameters can best be 
described as a work in progress over the past several decades.  
Some judicial decisions greatly expanded the right by focusing 
primarily on protecting celebrities from unauthorized free riding.  
This has included commercial use of a person’s name, likeness, or 
anything that conjures up an association with the celebrity even if 
 
party can negatively affect the mark’s value. See Franklin Mint Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
169–70 (quoting Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 341 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 342 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
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consumers would be unlikely to believe the person approved of or 
endorsed the product or service involved.  Other judicial decisions 
recognized that the right must be balanced against competing 
concerns such as promoting competition, accommodating freedom 
of speech concerns, and maintaining a robust public domain 
comprised of things that are free for all to use.  Such balancing has 
long been a part of the traditional bodies of intellectual property 
law.  This well-developed balancing approach should be adopted 
and made applicable to the interest protected by the right of 
publicity by utilizing the traditional likelihood of consumer 
confusion standard applied in trademark and unfair competition 
actions.  This would allow right of publicity actions when a 
person’s persona is used in a confusion-based commercial activity 
but not when only an association-based commercial relationship is 
involved.  Additionally, in light of the broad scope of modern 
trademark law and the broad application of unfair competition 
actions, virtually any confusion-based commercial activity could 
be redressed under trademark law and/or unfair competition law 
using a likelihood of confusion standard in lieu of a right of 
publicity action.  This approach is consistent with the underlying 
utilitarian justification for intellectual property law, which 
primarily seeks to enlarge the public domain by incentivizing 
innovators and creators by providing limited property rights for a 
variety of creative products.  By analogy to the rights granted to 
famous trademarks pursuant to dilution theory, additional 
protection for association-based commercial use of a person’s 
persona should be limited to famous individuals who are widely 
known by the general public. 
